SECOND DIVISION
PHILIPPINE
LONG DISTANCE G.R. No.
149379
TELEPHONE
COMPANY, INC.,
Petitioner, Present:
PUNO,
J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
-
versus –
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA,
JJ.
HOMER IMPERIAL,
Respondent. Promulgated:
June
15, 2006
X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
x
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the nullification of the
decision and Resolution dated
The
facts of the case are as follows:
Respondent
Homer Imperial worked with petitioner PLDT since P11,000.[1]
During
his employment, Imperial was given a provincial assignment at petitioner’s Malolos, Bulacan Exchange Branch.
He was, however, re-assigned to the Makati Reposo Branch on
On
the morning of
About
457 feet of cable wires cut into three rolls were recovered by the group. On
their way back to the warehouse, however, the vehicle the group was riding was
allegedly having a mechanical malfunction. This prompted Buenaventura to order
the unloading of 254.3 feet of the recovered cables, which was valued at P26,900, from their service vehicle at a nearby house
located at No. 4 Manalo St., Tipas,
Taguig, Metro Manila, owned by the spouses Francisco
and Edwina Flores. Francisco Flores at that time was an employee of petitioner
PLDT.
After
unloading, the group proceeded to Ortigas Extension, Taytay, Rizal,
to recover messenger wires. Except for the 254.3 feet of cable wires, the rest
were delivered by the group of
Acting
on an alleged report more than a week later or on
Subsequently,
the Taguig Police Station endorsed a case for
Qualified Theft before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal against respondent Imperial, Rommel
Cruz, Wilfredo Barroga,
Victor Buenaventura and Francisco Flores for appropriate action.
In
their “Pinagsanib na Sinumpaang Salaysay” dated
During the company-level
investigation, however, respondent Imperial, Barroga
and Cruz submitted a joint written explanation on December 15, 1992 regarding
the incident stating that due to the heavy weight of the cable wires, Foreman
Victor Buenaventura ordered them to unload a portion of the cable wires from
the service vehicle. Upon unloading, he proceeded to a nearby house owned by
the spouses Flores. After talking to Edwina Flores, he went back to his group
and instructed them to leave the 254.3 feet of cable wires at the
Meanwhile, Prosecutor Leodegario C. Quilatan
recommended that an Information for Qualified Theft be
filed against Imperial, Victor Buenaventura, Wilfredo
Barroga, Rommel Cruz and
Francisco Flores. This was approved by Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro.
Accordingly, an information for qualified theft was
filed before the
On
The trial court, however, acquitted
respondent and the rest of the accused of the offense charged for insufficiency
of evidence.[6]
On P11,000
per month plus the regular monthly or
yearly increases from March 25, 1993 until his actual reinstatement; (3) moral
damages in the amount of P1,000,000; and, (4) P500,000 as
exemplary damages.
On
After
an objective evaluation of the pleading, including the documentary evidence adduced
by the parties, we are of the opinion that the complainant was dismissed for a
just cause.
It appears that on
Considering this glaring
inconsistency and contradiction, we find the declaration of the complainant
that the 250 cable feet wires [was] unloaded from their service vehicle for
safekeeping in the house of Edwina Flores to be self-serving. As such, it has
no probative value.
There is no doubt that the defect on
the service vehicle is only on the muffler. This can be gleaned from the
Vehicle Trouble Repair Report No. 69537 dated
The complainant even went to the
extent of misleading this Office by alleging that Foreman Buenaventura made a
report on the 250 feet cables found in the house of Edwina Flores. Records tend
to show that he (complainant) already knew as early as
Even Foreman Buenaventura himself
rebuked the complainant by declaring categorically that he did not make a
report on the cables left in the house of Edwina Flores. Thus, Foreman
Buenaventura declared on September 5, 1992, that: “Gusto ko
lang po idagdag
kaya po hindi
nabalikan ang nasabing cable dahil wala po akong
sasakyan at hindi ko na rin
naireport na may iniwan akong kable
sa bahay nila Mrs. Edwina Flores sa aking supervisor na si Mr. Expedito Gudawen dahil naghahanap
ako ng sasakyan
na mahihiram.” (Annex
“1-A”, No. 13, Reply to the position paper of the complainant).
On the other hand, the evidence submitted
by the respondent substantially proves that the complainant is involved in [the]
pilferage of the 250 feet cable wires. He (complainant) was one of those who
unloaded the cable wires from their service vehicle and then stored them in the
house of Edwina Flores. This was borne out (sic) by the statement of his
companion, Mr. Rommel Cruz (Annex “2”, No. 6, Reply
of the respondent) and by the memorandum of Prosecutor Leodegario
Quilatan recommending that a criminal information for Qualified Theft
be filed against complainant Imperial and his companion, namely: Victor
Buenaventura, Rommel Cruz, Wilfredo
Barroga and Francisco Flores (Annex “7,” respondent’s
position paper). The cable wires remained in the house of Edwina Flores until
it was retrieved therein by operatives of the PLDT Security Department and Taguig Police Force on
In a desperate attempt to conceal
his liability, the complainant presented Cable Recovery No. 40726 (Annex “B-1,”
Affidavit of the complainant) which shows that Foreman Buenaventura allegedly
turned over to the warehouse 250 feet cables on September 4, 1992. However, we
found the Cable Recovery No. 40726 to be questionable. As correctly pointed out
by the respondent, “How then can foreman
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises
considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the instant complaint for
lack of merit.[7]
Respondent
appealed the above decision to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
arguing that the
On
x x x
Complainant therefore, cannot solely
rely on the reasonable doubt which led to his acquittal in the aforesaid
criminal case and pray that because of the existence of such doubt, this
complaint shall be resolved in his favor. Such proposition cannot be applied in this
jurisdiction. As correctly found by the Labor Arbiter, there is on record
substantial evidence sufficient to warrant complainant’s valid dismissal. And
as defined by the Supreme Court, substantial evidence is such amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.
Moreover, the High Tribunal [as]
aptly observed that “the Labor arbiter, as trier of
facts in the arbitral proceedings below, is at a vantage position offering him
the first-hand opportunity to come out with credible factual findings x x x.” Hence, the findings of the
Labor Arbiter should be respected and left undisturbed there being substantial
evidence to support them.
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing
premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED and the appeal
DISMISSED for lack of merit.[9]
Maintaining
that a motion for reconsideration of the above resolution was unnecessary as
the issues that would have been raised therein will only be a reiteration of
the matters that had been passed upon and concluded in the NLRC, Imperial filed
a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC.
Declaring Imperial’s failure to file
a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC decision as a fatal procedural defect,
the Court of Appeals, in its Resolution, dated June 9, 2000, dismissed the
petition.
On
After reviewing the merits of the
case, the Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision, dated
x x
x
[T]his
court is convinced that petitioner merely acted according to the instructions
of
x x x
More importantly, We
rule that the case of BLTB Co. vs. NLRC (166 SCRA 721) cited by private
respondent has no application in the case at bar. The person who has the duty
to report to his immediate supervisor of the recovery of the cables in question
was not petitioner but
x x x
In the instant petition, the act of
petitioner is not enough ground for his termination. Hence, We
hold that the proofs presented by private respondent are insufficient to show
dishonesty on the part of petitioner and that the latter was dismissed without
just cause. Private respondent is deemed to have acted arbitrarily when it
dismissed petitioner based on loss of confidence.
x x x
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of public respondent
NLRC dated
SO ORDERED.[11]
Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration of the above decision was denied by the Court of Appeals in
its resolution issued on
Hence, this petition.
The
grounds[12]
upon which this petition is based are the following:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED, CONTRARY
TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, IN REVERSING THE NLRC’S AND THE LABOR ARBITER’S
FINDINGS OF FACT, WHICH WERE AMPLY SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. AS HELD
BY THIS HONORABLE COURT IN A LONG LINE OF CASES, IN THE ABSENCE OF A DESPOTIC
ABUSE OF ITS DISCRETION BY THE NLRC, THE NLRC’S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE NOT
SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW EVEN IF THERE BE A SIMPLE ERROR IN JUDGMENT – WHICH
ERROR WAS NOT COMMITTED IN THIS CASE.
II
THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED, CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, AND LIKEWISE ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION IN REINSTATING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI BEFORE IT, DESPITE
RESPONDENT’S UNJUSTIFIABLE EXCUSE IN NOT MOVING FOR THE RECONSIDERATION OF THE
NLRC’S ADVERSE RESOLUTION IN VIOLATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
Briefly, the issues to be determined
are whether, under the circumstances: 1) the findings of facts of the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC are subject to judicial review; and, 2) the failure to file a
motion for reconsideration of the NLRC resolution is a fatal procedural defect.
Petitioner questions the authority of
the Court of Appeals in reversing the findings of the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC when the court a quo, upon re-examining the evidence on record, expressed
that Imperial had been illegally dismissed for want of substantial proof as to
his alleged complicity in relation to the wire cables that were not brought
back to petitioner’s warehouse.
To recapitulate, the NLRC grounded
its findings supporting the dismissal of Imperial mainly on three instances: 1)
when Imperial helped in the unloading of the cable wires in the house of
Flores; 2) when the latter presented Cable Recovery No. 40726 (Annex “B-1,”
Affidavit of complainant) showing that Buenaventura allegedly turned over the
250 feet cable wires to the warehouse on September 4, 1993, manifesting an
attempt for him to conceal his liability but which had failed otherwise because
said cable wires were recovered from the house of Flores by the police on
September 11, 1992; and, 3) the inconsistent statements given by the employees
involved in the alleged pilferage with regard to the defect of the vehicle.
The Court of Appeals, upon reviewing
the case, however, disagreed with the above assessment declaring that there was
an utter failure to justify the termination of Imperial based on loss of trust
and confidence. It added that the proofs presented by PLDT were not sufficient
to show theft or dishonesty on the part of Imperial and that the latter was
dismissed without just cause.[13]
The
exercise of the power of judicial review is mandated under Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution, which states:
Judicial power includes the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
The Court of Appeals, in view of its expanded jurisdiction
over labor cases elevated to it through a petition for certiorari such as in
this case, may look into the records of the case and re-examine the questioned
findings if it considers the same to be necessary to arrive at a just decision.[14]
This rule is further enunciated in
the case of St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC,[15]
wherein this Court stated:
x x x Ever since appeals from the
NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that
the
special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper judicial review
of decisions of the NLRC.
x x x
While
we do not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the matter of the
wisdom of a law, on this score we add the further observation that there is a
growing number of labor cases being elevated to this Court, which, not being a trier of fact, has at times been constrained to remand the
case to the NLRC for resolution of unclear or ambiguous factual findings; that
the Court of Appeals is procedurally equipped for that purpose, aside from the
increased number of its component divisions; and that there is undeniably an
imperative need for expeditious action on labor cases as a major aspect of
constitutional protection to labor.
Therefore
all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P No. 129 to supposed appeals from
the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and
refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such
petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in
strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate
forum for the relief desired.”
Thus,
the law no longer provides for an appeal from the decisions of the Labor
Arbiter or from the NLRC. The mode of review from said decisions is the special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in the
Court of Appeals.
Further,
when the circumstances so warrant, the Court of Appeals can disregard the
factual findings of the NLRC. While as a
rule, factual findings of agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions such as
the NLRC are accorded not only respect but even finality, [16]
and that judicial review of labor cases does not go so far as to evaluate the
sufficiency of evidence on which the labor officials’ findings rest; more so
when both the labor arbiter and the NLRC share the same findings, such as in
the present case, the Court cannot affirm the decision of the NLRC when its
findings of fact on which the conclusion was based are not supported by
substantial evidence. By substantial evidence, we mean the amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify the
conclusion.[17]
Based on the foregoing, for want of
substantial basis, in fact or in law, the factual findings of an administrative
agency,[18]
such as the NLRC, cannot be given the stamp of finality and conclusiveness
normally accorded to it, as even decisions of administrative agencies which are
declared “final” by law are not exempt form judicial review when so warranted.[19] Contrary
to petitioner’s assertion, therefore, the Court of Appeals, under the
circumstances, may review the findings of fact made by the Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC. Thus, this Court sees no error on the part of the Court of Appeals when
it made a new determination of the case and, upon this, reversed the ruling of
the NLRC.
As
to the second issue, petitioner contends that the petition for certiorari filed
by respondent before the Court of Appeals is dismissible for the latter’s
failure to move for a reconsideration of the NLRC resolution.
In this regard, the New Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC mandates that a motion for reconsideration of any order,
resolution or decision of the Commission must be filed within the ten-day reglementary period; otherwise, the assailed order,
resolution or decision shall become final and executory
after ten calendar days from receipt thereof.
Before certiorari may be availed of, the
petitioner must have filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order or act
complained of to enable the tribunal, board, or office concerned to pass upon
and correct its mistakes without the intervention of the higher court.[20]
Thus, generally, a petitioner’s
failure to file a motion for reconsideration, for whatever reason, is a fatal
procedural defect that warrants the dismissal of the petition.[21]
One of the accepted exceptions[22]
to this rule, however, is when a motion for reconsideration would have been
useless. As explained in the case of Midas Touch Food Corp. v.
NLRC:[23]
Petitioners
now come before us assailing the decision of the NLRC, without filing any
motion for reconsideration. While a motion for reconsideration under the Rules
of Court is required before a petition for certiorari is filed, the rules admit
of certain exceptions, among which is the finding that under the circumstances
of the case, a motion for reconsideration would be useless.
In
this case, the NLRC had reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and no new
issues were raised in this appeal. We find it quite impossible for the NLRC to
reverse itself under the foregoing facts and so, a motion for reconsideration
will be deemed useless. Hence, by reason of justice and equity, we resolve to
settle the issues on the merits in order to avoid further delay.”
Likewise,
we have ruled that with regard to procedural errors committed by a party to a
case, fundamental consideration of substantial justice persuades us to decide
the case on the merits rather than to dismiss it on a technicality. In so
doing, we exercise our prerogative in labor cases that no undue sympathy is to
be accorded to any claim of procedural misstep, the idea being that our power
must be exercised according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the
controversy.[24]
In addition, in exceptional cases and
for compelling reasons, this Court has disregarded procedural defects in order
to correct a patent injustice. A writ of certiorari is a prerogative writ, not
demandable as a matter of right, but issued in the exercise of judicial
discretion. [25]
In view of the above, this Court
finds that the Court of Appeals neither erred nor abused its discretion when it
admitted respondent’s petition for certiorari. Considering that only questions
of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari, [26]
our jurisdiction in cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals is limited to
reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact
being generally conclusive.
It is not the function of this Court to
analyze or weigh evidence all over again. Barring, therefore, a showing that
the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the records, or
that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of
discretion, such findings must stand, for this Court is not expected or required
to examine or assess the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the
parties.[27]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57807, dated
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chairperson
Associate Justice
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Acting Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, p. 28.
[2] To
“recover” is “to deliver or return” as understood in warehouse transactions. (Rollo, p. 29).
[3] CA
Rollo, p. 44.
[4]
[5] Rollo, p. 30.
[6]
[7] Records,
pp. 7-10.
[8] Rollo, p. 33.
[9]
[10] CA
Rollo, pp. 95-96.
[11] Rollo, pp. 37-41.
[12]
[13] CA
Rollo, pp. 157-159.
[14] Globe Telecom, Inc. v. Florendo-Flores,
G.R. No. 150092,
[15] G.R.
No. 130866,
[16] Sta Fe. Construction Co. v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 101280,
[17] Nazario C. Austria v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 123646, July 14, 1999, 310 SCRA 293, citing Fernandez
v. NLRC, G.R. No. 108444, November 6, 1997, 281 SCRA 423; and, Panlilio v. NLRC, G.R. No. 117459, October
17, 1997, 281 SCRA 53.
[18] The
case of Industrial Timber Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No.83616, January
20, 1989, 169 SCRA 341, states; “x x x [T]his court has never hesitated to exercise its
corrective powers and to reverse administrative decisions in the following
cases: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded on speculations, surmises and
conjectures; (2) the inferences made are manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) there is a misapprehension
of facts; (5) the court in arriving at its findings went beyond the issues of
the case and the same are contrary to the admission s of the parties or the
evidence presented; (6) where respondent commission has sustained irregular
procedures and through the invocation of summary methods, including rules on
appeal, has affirmed an order which tolerates a violation of due process; and,
(7) where the rights of a party were prejudiced because the administrative
findings, conclusions or decision were in violation of constitutional
provisions, in excess of statutory authority, or jurisdiction, made upon
irregular procedure, vitiated by fraud, imposition or mistake, not supported by
substantial evidence adduced at the hearing or contained in the records or disclosed
to the parties, or arbitrary, or capricious.”
[19] Chung
Fu Industries (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96283, February
25, 1992, 206 SCRA 545.
[20] Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) v. National
Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 112629,
[21] Labudahon, et al. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 112206,
[22] Alindao v. Joson,
G.R. No.114132, November 14, 1996, 264 SCRA 211, states: “It has been held that the requirement of a
motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with in the following
instances: (1) when the issue raised is
one purely of law; (2) where public interest is involved; (3) in cases of
urgency; and (4) where special circumstances warrant immediate or direct
action. On the other hand, among the accepted exceptions to the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies are: (1) where the question in dispute is
purely a legal one; and, (2) where the controverted
act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction.”
[23] G.R.
No. 111639,
[24] Antonio Surima v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 121147,
[25] Nayve v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144117,
[26] Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. v. ICC
Leasing and Financing Corporation, G.R. No. 150673, February 28, 2003, 398
SCRA 508.
[27] Universal
Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 47432,